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Honor Ethics

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Honor Ethics

Category Archives: social psychology of honor

Honor in the Modern World: Interdisciplinary Perspectives

29 Thursday Sep 2016

Posted by dan demetriou in announcements, history of honor, honor and international relations, honor and international studies, honor and political philosophy, honor and war, honor code, military ethics, philosophy of honor, political science of honor, social psychology of honor

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Dan Demetriou, Laurie Johnson

I’m happy to report—somewhat belatedly—that Honor in the Modern World is now for sale!

Edited by Laurie Johnson and me, the book is probably the most interdisciplinary study of honor yet. We are very grateful to our contributors—many of whom contribute to this blog—for their excellent and highly original essays.

After a century-long hiatus, honor is back. Academics, pundits, and everyday citizens alike are rediscovering the importance of this ancient and powerful human motive. This volume brings together some of the foremost researchers of honor to debate honor’s meaning and its compatibility with liberalism, democracy, and modernity. Contributors—representing philosophy, sociology, political science, history, psychology, leadership studies, and military science—examine honor past to present, from masculine and feminine perspectives, and in North American, European, and African contexts. Topics include the role of honor in the modern military, the effects of honor on our notions of the dignity and “purity” of women, honor as a quality of good statesmen and citizens, honor’s role in international relations and community norms, and how honor’s egalitarian and elitist aspects intersect with democratic and liberal regimes.

The table of contents can be see on Amazon, along with lots of sample viewing. Consider ordering a copy for your school’s library, as the book includes essays useful for philosophers, political scientists, historians, international relations scholars, psychologists, and military academicians.

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Friedrichs and Berg: “Rhodes must fall: from dignity to honour values”

15 Monday Feb 2016

Posted by dan demetriou in history of honor, honor and international relations, honor in the news, political science of honor, social psychology of honor, sociology of honor

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Bradley Campbell, Jason Manning, Joerg Friedrichs, Microaggression and Moral Cultures, Rhodes Must Fall, Ryan Berg

In an OpenDemocracy post published today, Joerg Friedrichs (International Development, Oxford) and Ryan Berg (currently a doctoral student at Brasenose College, Oxford) argue that the Rhodes Must Fall campaign at Oxford exemplifies the pernicious qualities of an emerging moral culture that honors victimhood, stifles speech, and privileges feelings over facts.

RMF protester

Photograph: Mike Hutchings/Reuters

Friedrich and Berg’s analysis builds off of an important article by Bradley Campbell (Sociology, UCLA) and Jason Manning (Sociology and Anthropology, West Virginia) entitled “Microaggression and Moral Cultures.” Campbell and Manning persuasively argue that we are transitioning from a dignity-based culture to an honor-based one of victimhood. By “dignity” culture they mean one that sees everyone as innately endowed with an unearned and inalienable moral worth. On this scheme, our basic moral equality is assumed, assaults on welfare and property are punished by a central authority, and insults are largely disregarded and thus comparatively rare. This regime replaced the traditional honor culture on which some people have more value than others, personal value could be easily lost through shame and insult, and riposte to offense had to be handled personally—the traditional honor culture.

Cecil Rhodes

“To think of these stars that you see overhead at night, these vast worlds which we can never reach. I would annex the planets if I could; I often think of that. It makes me sad to see them so clear and yet so far.”

According to Campbell and Manning, the new honor culture of victimhood combines and inverts various aspects of its predecessors. Like a traditional honor culture, victimhood culture is highly stratified and is highly sensitive to insult. However, it elevates victims and demotes non-victims, which traditional honor cultures would find bizarre. Moreover, on it offenses to dignity are properly handled by authorities, not personally, as if they were “material” attacks on person or property (hence “microaggressions” and not the more accurate “micro-offenses”). These appeals to authority are what makes this honor culture so dangerous to free speech and inquiry. 

For their part, Friedrichs and Berg take no stance on whether the Rhodes statue should fall. What they bemoan is the way RMF activists hijack debate with the imperative of their offense and puritanical zeal. Here’s a teaser:

While students were not that supportive, the RMF movement found resonance with the media. This was due to the fact that those campaigning associated themselves, in sometimes tenuous ways, with the victims of colonialism, racism, and other forms of vicitimisation. The movement thus exemplified the move towards offense taking and the celebration of victimhood. It hardly occurred to the campaigners that an honest dialogue about Rhodes, his highly controversial legacy, and the merits and demerits of censoring history might have been more befitting of Oxford than trying to sanitize the place from anything potentially offensive and unpleasant, such as association with an ambivalent and flawed character like Cecil Rhodes.

I encourage you to read the whole post: “Rhodes must fall: from dignity to honour Values.”

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Honor and racial justice

03 Sunday Jan 2016

Posted by bcb in honor in contempory media, social psychology of honor

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Identity-based oppression is usually framed as a harm to dignity. When someone has suffered an injustice based on their race or gender, we commonly say that they have not been treated with dignity, or that their dignity has been violated. On the dignity account of oppression, oppression is morally wrong because 1) it is a failure to respect an individual as a human being, due to their identity in a social group, and/or 2) it is a failure to even recognize that an individual is a human, due to their identity. Note that social identity is the reason for oppression, on this account, but it is not the primary thing that is being disrespected. What is being disrespected is fundamental humanity, if we can abstract such a thing from supposedly morally irrelevant features of identity. To stop oppression, we should get oppressors to see their victims as humans. We need not respect collectives as such, only the humanity of individuals within these collectives.

I am skeptical that the dignity account correctly diagnoses the nature of oppression. Oppression seems to occur not because people fail to see similarity, but because they fail to respect difference. At best, the dignity account tells an incomplete story. It may even go so far as to obscure the nature of oppression so that some means of resistance are seen as illegitimate. I want to suggest that honor, an old tool that has historically been used by radical activists, might allow us to look at oppression with new eyes. As Sharon Krause has noted in Liberalism With Honor, Frederick Douglass and the suffragists have framed their oppression using the language of honor, emphasizing the martial virtues and the duty to stand up or die trying. So have radicals from groups as diverse as the founding Zionists and the Black Power movement, who rejected assimilation into the dominant culture and thought their cultures worthy of special respect. Today, black racial justice activists continue this tradition by describing the Baltimore protests as an “uprising” and emphasizing self-love not in spite of their race, but because of it. Since these individuals were and are on the frontlines of resistance, we should take the idea of honor seriously instead of trying to shoehorn their ethos and actions into the dignity framework. Continue reading →

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Pinker on honor

09 Tuesday Jun 2015

Posted by dan demetriou in biology of honor, evolution of honor, history of honor, honor in the news, social psychology of honor

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Culture of Honor, Hobbes on honor, Steven Pinker

Just found this short clip, with Pinker adverting to the Nisbett-Cohen line on “cultures of honor,” and lumping for benefits of the leviathan.

The point-person on this topic is Laurie Johnson, who discusses at length the moral disadvantages of the Hobbesian response to honor, the greatest of which is its Thomas Hobbes--Turning Point for Honorelevation of base human motives (security and wealth) over nobler aims, such as dignity, celebrated excellence, and sacrifice.

And you can go here for evidence that the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence-based hypothesis for honor’s violence is incorrect, given that honor cultures have been singularly unconcerned with deterring violence and require all sorts of behaviors that make men easier, not harder, targets of aggression. Masculine honor traditionally welcomes aggression. It institutionalized violence if things got too peaceful.

The Nisbett-Cohen account is a product of the psychology Hobbes sought to propagate: explanations should be based on security and property, since deep down that’s what people care about (read: those are the motives Hobbes’ political philosophy could make sense of). The foolhardy disregard for safety and wealth we see across cultures strongly suggests that this is false, and biology goes a long way to explaining why.

It strikes me as much more compatible with the evidence that the origin of masculine honor violence is found in male mating strategies, especially mate-guarding, resource-provision, and competitive display. For instance, masculine honor usually requires men to fiercely defend their women’s chastity (mate guarding, at the root of lots of “culture of honor” behaviors), while it also requires fair and respectful contest between equally-matched combatants (male competitive display, which I argue is the root of agonistic honor). Plausibly, as humans grew more intelligent, this hodgepodge of instincts became culturally entrenched and identified with masculine excellence. You simply weren’t a good man—a man worthy of respect—if you didn’t perform in these adaptive ways. Thus masculine honor.

Do the traditional norms of masculine honor “debunk” honor in some way? I don’t think so. Consider justice, a value Pinker would be quick to endorse. It is worth remembering that our application of justice norms have justified shocking cruelty…

medieval torture

…and  continue to do so.

ca-prison-holding2

And if that wasn’t enough, justice was once thought to require eternal torture in the afterlife for most of us.

Bosch_-_The_Harrowing_of_Hell

Honor skeptics tend ignore the evil past of our older, cruder conceptions of justice, however. They would never allow that medievals (or even today’s lawmakers) actually “got justice right.” They tend to think our conception of justice is constantly improving, refined by conceptual analysis, experience, and ethical debate. For some reason, however, the most backward hillbilly or unreflective cattle-herder gets the final say on what honor is. Exposing this double-standard is one of the first tasks of the honor apologist.

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Dairy Queen hero Joey Prusak, and the honorableness of protecting the weak

23 Monday Sep 2013

Posted by dan demetriou in honor code, honor in contempory media, honor system, social psychology of honor, stories of honor

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prusakAt a Minnesota Dairy Queen last week, a blind customer pulled out some money and accidently dropped a $20 bill. The customer just behind quickly picked up the bill and pocketed it. Joey Prusak, the Dairy Queen server, saw what happened, and directed the second customer to return the money. She refused. So Prusak expelled her from the restaurant, and gave the blind customer a twenty from his own pocket. Appreciative customers alerted Dairy Queen management, and Prusak’s story has gone viral.

Interestingly for our purposes, Prusak’s story is being described in the language of honor.

Yahoo: “Dairy Queen Employee’s Honorable Actions Praised Online”

DailyMail: “Honorable: Joey Prusak, 19, said that returning the money to the blind man ‘felt like it was the right thing to do’”.

Webpronews: “Honorable Dairy Queen Employee Does the Right Thing”

I think honor researchers have a lot to say about the “extra” condemnation we feel when someone wrongs a vulnerable party, and why we tend to call “honorable” those who protect the weak.

Continue reading →

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Honor’s roots in male-male competition

30 Tuesday Jul 2013

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, biology of honor, ethology of honor, evolution of honor, honor and sport, honor code, honor in literature, honor system, philosophy of honor, social psychology of honor

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Some social psychologists have recently proposed taxonomies of the fundamental moral sentiments . . ..The emotions and practices of honor—esteem, contempt, respect, deference—developed, it is reasonable to suppose, with hierarchy in troops of early humans. Is honor, in this way, atavistic? It’s not a worry we can immediately dismiss.

–Kwame Appiah, The Honor Code, pp. 183-184

Some sort of moral pluralism—at least on the psychological level—is increasingly probable: a recent consensus statement by a number of cutting-edge moral psychologists affirms Jonathan Haidt et al.’s hypothesis that there are multiple building blocks of morality, each with its own evolutionary history.

Notably, Haidt’s taxonomy recognizes only one moral foundation that concerns rank: authoritarianism. But we have ample evidence in, say, athletic or academic rankings, that some rankings are not authoritarian. Also notable is that none of Haidt et al.’s (currently six) moral foundations has norms rooted in sexual selection, which is enormously influential in shaping behavior in many species, including us. Third, as Haidt’s taxonomy expanded, it lost the ability to account for shame and contempt, one of the “big three” condemnatory affect pairings that Moral Foundations theory was designed to accommodate. Fourth, Haidt sees his “harm/care” foundation as based in maternal instincts. This raises the question: could there be an ethos that is based on some sort of adaptive challenge males might have faced more often?

I think the honor ethos is one of these innate moral systems, and that honor fills all four gaps in Haidt’s theory.

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Jews and honor in literature, pt. 2: honor vs. purity

01 Saturday Jun 2013

Posted by dan demetriou in honor code, honor in literature, honor system, philosophy of honor, social psychology of honor, stories of honor

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As discussed in the previous post, O’Brian’s Richard Canning, despite his aptitude and desire to be a naval officer, was excluded from the world of martial honor because he was a Jew. Thus, the naval officer Stephen Maturin strangely honors aCanning by noticing Canning’s insult and challenging him to a duel. The theme of Jews being shut out of the world of honor is also quite prominent in Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe. This time it is a Jewish woman, Rebecca, who is barred from assuming the social station her talents and natural nobility entitle her to. In this post, I focus on the way religion and notions of purity differ from the warrior-aristocratic norms of honor, and note how Scott skillfully uses medieval anti-Semitism to contrast these two ethics.

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Pastoralists and Honor: The Significance of Raiding to the Nisbett-Cohen Account of Honor

22 Monday Oct 2012

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, honor in literature, philosophy of honor, social psychology of honor

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In my previous post, I mentioned the account of “cultures of honor” forwarded by Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen: on it, honor is an adaptive social construct constituted by tendencies to respond violently to threats or insults, thereby communicating to would-be attackers that the honorable person is dangerous prey and not to be trifled with. Nisbett and Cohen argue that these tendencies are rational in lawless circumstances where goods are easily stolen. For instance, cattle are easily rustled while crops are not, and this fact is used to explain why pastoralists are more often governed by honor norms than are agriculturalists. The pastoralist-honor connection is in turn used to explain the elevated honor-mindedness and violence one finds in the U.S. South, since that region was colonized by pastoralists from the British periphery.

I’d like to note in this post one difficulty with the Nisbett-Cohen account as I understand it. (I discuss my concerns more fully in an unpublished manuscript called “What Should Realists Say About Honor Cultures.”) The problem is simply this: if honor is a deterrence-based social construct, and this is used to explain why pastoralist societies tend to be cultures of honor, then it’s difficult to see why pastoralists would encourage raiding and praise it as honorable. But they tend to do just this.

Here are some interesting quotes about the connection between pastoralists and raiding:

Continue reading →

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Mark Collier on Cultures of Honor and Moral Diversity

23 Sunday Sep 2012

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, philosophy of honor, social psychology of honor

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Some honorethics.org contributors and readers will be familiar with the work by Richard Nisbett, Dov Cohen, and their collaborators on “cultures of honor,” as set forth in their important 1996 Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South.

Culture of Honor

In this book and the many subsequent articles based upon it, honor is an adaptive social construct constituted by tendencies to respond violently to threats or insults, thereby communicating to would-be attackers that the honorable person is dangerous prey and not to be trifled with. Nisbett and Cohen argue that these tendencies are rational in lawless circumstances where goods are easily stolen. For instance, cattle are easily rustled while crops are not, and this fact is used to explain why pastoralists are more often governed by honor norms than are agriculturalists. The pastoralist-honor connection is in turn used to explain the elevated honor-mindedness and violence one finds in the U.S. South, since that region was colonized by pastoralists from the British periphery.

Empirically-informed philosophers have seized upon the Nisbett-Cohen account of cultures of honor, usually taking it to suggest some sort of antirealist conclusion. For instance, John Doris, Stephen Stich, and Alexandra Plakias have argued that cultures of honor provide us with evidence of fundamental moral disagreement between liberal and honor cultures, i.e., disagreement that would persist even in ideal conditions, where all the non-moral facts were known, where each side was rational, and so forth.

My colleague (and honorethics.org contributor) Mark Collier has a paper forthcoming in the Journal of Scottish Philosophy criticizing this inference (now posted under honor scholarship). Using Hume’s notion of an “indulgent” stance towards cultural differences, Collier argues that even the findings of the culture of honor literature can be accommodated by convergentists, or people who deny the intractability of moral disagreement. For Collier, a core set of human values are plausibly universal, and the diversity we see can be explained by (and this is not necessarily an exhaustive list):

  • factual mistakes: you may think that dueling or carrying guns around makes people more polite, but it may in fact not;
  • differences in material circumstance: in tough circumstances, martial values may be emphasized;
  • and (in what is probably the most provocative part of the paper) different cultural conventions, which manifest these values in different ways, or weigh competing universal values differently.

On the last point, Collier considers some studies showing that Chinese are more willing than Americans to say that a magistrate may morally frame an innocent person for a murder he didn’t commit in order to prevent a mob from murdering more innocent people. Does this serve as evidence of fundamental moral disagreement? Collier doesn’t think so:

But this experimental result need not be interpreted in terms of a basic difference in attitude. The participants in the studies presumably share the same values: the welfare of individuals and society matter to everyone.  The groups merely disagree about how to prioritize these values when they come into conflict; the “mob and the magistrate” vignette, after all, is a classic moral dilemma. This study does not support the claim, then, that core values are fixed by enculturation. This type of disagreement between East Asians and Westerners merely indicates, rather, that there is a range of adequate natural moralities . . ..

Here’s Collier’s abstract.

In “A Dialogue”, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic.  Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our basic values are fixed by enculturation.  Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward those whose attitudes differ from ours.  He proposes a more charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to fundamental principles of human nature.  Contemporary philosophers attempt to locate examples of moral variability that cannot be accommodated in this way.  But they are no more successful than their predecessors.  Moral skeptics have yet to find a single case of moral diversity that is resistant to the Humean strategy. 

I think Collier’s paper really advances the debate about the metaethical significance of honor-based norms. He welcomes comments; you can find the paper here.

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Honor, liberation, and admiration for those who resist

04 Friday Nov 2011

Posted by dan demetriou in history of honor, social psychology of honor, stories of honor

≈ 5 Comments

One of the characteristics of something we might term the “honor ethos” is that honor-minded people tend to respond favorably to those who resist, even if that resistance is aimed at the honor-minded people themselves.

This is distinctive: a Christian evangelical might protest, say, slavery by arguing that we are all created in God’s image; a liberal might decry slavery by appeal to human rights grounded on a hypothetical contract; a Kantian might invoke the slave’s humanity; a utilitarian the non-optimal consequences of slavery, and so forth.

But two considerations against oppression seem uniquely honor-based. The first is that (in my opinion, at least) honor-minded people tend to want to compete for status and to compete for it fairly. If it is realized that some groups aren’t given a “level playing field” (I insist this is an honor trope!), then honor-based sentiments are activated and the honor-minded person wants to rectify this—not for the sake of the disadvantaged party, but for the advantaged one.

But the second honor-based consideration against oppression is what I’m interested in here. One sees time and time again, in history, literature, and one’s own intuitions (if attentive to them), that honor-typical sentiments are stirred when an oppressed person or group stands up and fights. Our sense of honor forces us to note and admire these heroes. The idea seems to be, “We thought your people were just weaker in whatever way, and that you lacked the spirit to fight for higher status. But now we see that you at least are a fighter. So welcome to the club.” Thus, heroic figures who resist oppression are important for winning freedom for their people in part because they force honor-minded people (and the honor-minded side of each of us) to see—perhaps for the first time—that the oppressed people or class isn’t inferior by nature. At least some of them are willing to fight.

One of my favorite examples of this dynamic is the story of the Amistad, a Spanish-Cuban slave-ship commandeered by kidnapped Africans.

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Kansas State mini-conference: "Perspectives on Modern Honor"

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Honor and Ethics Mini-Conference

Contributors

  • Andrea Mansker
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  • Graham Oddie
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  • Sharon Krause
  • Steven Skultety
  • Tamler Sommers
  • Tony Cunningham
  • Valerie Soon

Recent posts

  • Two new books on honor by contributors Tamler Sommers and Craig Bruce Smith
  • Jordan Peterson on the play/honor (agonism) ethic
  • Honor and the Military Photo Scandal
  • HonorShame.com write-up of Honor in the Modern World
  • “Ethics for Adversaries” blog

Contributors’ Books

Johnson and Demetriou's Honor in the Modern World

Peter Olsthoorn's Honor in Political and Moral Philosophy

Joe Thomas' Leadership, Ethics and Law of War Discussion Guide for Marines

Anthony Cunningham's Modern Honor

Laurie Johnson's Locke and Rousseau: Two Enlightenment Responses to Honor

Peter Olsthoorn's Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st Century

Tamler Sommers' A Very Bad Wizard

Lad Sessions' Honor For Us

Andrea Mansker's Sex, Honor and Citizenship in Early Third Republic France

Laurie Johnson's Thomas Hobbes: Turning Point for Honor

Shannon French's The Code of the Warrior

Sharon Krause's Liberalism With Honor

Robert Oprisko's Honor: A Phenomenology

Graham Oddie's Value, Reality, Desire

Paul Robinson's Military Honour and the Conduct of War

Jim Peterman's Philosophy as Therapy

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