Defense with Dignity—is violent resistance more dignified and if so, what follows for gun rights?

30 Thursday Apr 2015

Posted by dan demetriou in honor and political philosophy, honor and the law, honor and war, philosophy of honor

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dignity and ethics, dignity and honor, gun control, gun rights, self-defense

In 2013, the Department of Public Safety at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS) caused a stir when it suggested female students vomit or urinate on themselves if attacked.

Unfortunately for UCCS, on-campus conceal-and-carry bills were being debated in Colorado at the time, so its post catalyzed a great deal of interest, including that of conservative pundit Michelle Malkin, who criticized these tactics as ineffective, infantilizing, and condescending.

Given that feminist and left-leaning sources were also unenthusiastic about these unsavory pointers, UCCS promptly cut its losses removed the page.

In its defense, UCCS’s recommendations were not idiosyncratic. For instance, See Sally Kick Ass: A Woman’s Guide to Personal Safety suggests that attacked women, among other things, rub their vomit or feces all over their bodies, as does Fight Back!: Safety and Self-Defense Tips, which adds “barking like a dog.”

And this got me thinking: What if these books were titled Bark Like a Dog! or worse, See Sally Rub Vomit on Herself? What would such titles communicate? Why did the authors emphasize violent resistance in their titles, but not so much in their actual advice?

This post isn’t about campus rape. It is, rather, a criticism of an assumption we tend to make in our discussions of resistance generally, namely, that advocates of violent resistance must show that it’s more effective than non-violent forms of resistance. For reasons of dignity, I don’t think that’s true.

Application: gun control

I will use gun control to approach this widespread assumption, although we might have used state-on-state aggression just as easily. There are four main reasons given to permit citizens to have guns: Continue reading →

Ajume Wingo: Source of Mandela’s greatness is that he gave up power

09 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by dan demetriou in announcements, history of honor, honor and the law, honor in contempory media, honor in the news, philosophy of honor, political science of honor, stories of honor

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mandela and honor

Honorethics.org contributor Ajume Wingo had a great letter published in the Denver Post yesterday on Nelson Mandela. It discusses an important point almost totally ignored in the encomia we are hearing about the South African president: how unique and important it was that Mandela gave up power.

The true source of Mandela’s greatness is how he gave up that power. It was his exit — dignified and orderly — more than anything else that sets him apart. His exit from office at the height of his power, popularity and health put him in the company of Cincinnatus of ancient Rome and George Washington — exemplars of the rule of law and the ideals of leadership in a republic.

I know Ajume has been thinking and writing on the theme of rulership and liberalism for some time. In the developed West, we have grown accustomed to our leaders stepping down when their tenure is up, but of course there is little reason to make the same assumption in many parts of the world. Figuring out how to persuade leaders to give up power—especially when the populace will let them get away with keeping it—would be huge accomplishment for the cause of liberalism and rule of law.

Could leaders be persuaded by money? Maybe. However, as Wingo’s piece notes, African billionaire Mo Ibrahim has funded a foundation offering $5 million, and an annual stipend of $200,000, to African leaders who (among other things) “serve their constitutionally mandated term.” The prize seems to be an insufficient incentive. Maybe the prize cannot compare to the richer spoils of electing oneself president for life. However, we do have some historical precedent on the matter. As Ajume notes, Washington and Cincinnatus also refused sorts of kingship.

Beyond their non-pecuniary motives, I cannot say much about Cincinnatus’ or Mandela’s motives. But in the case of Washington, some historians argue that concern for honor was key. Douglass Adair, Lorrraine Smith Pangle and Thomas Pangle, Joanne Freeman, and Gordon Wood all speak to the concern Washington had for his honor and reputation. Continue reading →

New book series: Honor and Obligation in Liberal Society

18 Monday Nov 2013

Posted by dan demetriou in announcements, history of honor, honor and the law, philosophy of honor, political science of honor

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I’m pleased to announce a new book series edited by honorethics.org contributors Laurie Johnson (Political Science, Kansas State) and Dan Demetriou (Philosophy, Minnesota-Morris) on the theme “Honor and Obligation in Liberal Society” (Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield).

Here is a description of the series’ purpose:

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Liberalism’s political, economic, and social benefits are undeniable. However, these benefits come with a price: liberal societies are losing their sense of honor, civic obligation, higher moral purpose, shared values, and community. This series focuses on classical liberalism, honor, and social and civic obligation.

We invite contributions on the problems raised by liberalism in general, and especially scholarship addressing how honor codes are challenged or changed by liberalism. We also welcome manuscripts which conceptualize liberalism in ways compatible with modern needs, and submissions covering the so-called “bourgeois virtues” extolled by liberal philosophers and their connection to materialism, individualism, and social obligation. Scholars who can address the international dimension of these questions are also sought: for instance, globalization may spread economic development, but at what expense to cultural norms and practices that have kept traditional societies intact?

The series is open to contributions from scholars representing classics, political science, international relations, philosophy, history, literature, religious studies, and other disciplines whose work bears on these questions. Successful proposals will be accessible to a multidisciplinary audience, and advance our understanding of liberalism, its development, and its repercussions for our future.

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You can find the proposal guidelines at lexingtonliberalism.com.

We are also contemplating an edited volume of essays on these themes, perhaps with an associated conference. Expect announcements about that in the Spring of 2014. In the meantime, we thank you for passing along this call for proposals/manuscripts to scholars writing on these topics.

Stolen Valor II: The Decision

08 Sunday Jul 2012

Posted by dan demetriou in honor and the law, political science of honor

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In case you missed it, the Supreme Court struck down the so-called “Stolen Valor” act in UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ. We discussed this case briefly earlier on this blog.

The text of the ruling can be found here. Obviously the issues concern the threat to free speech, the value of lying in relation to what it is that makes free speech valuable in the first place, and the nature of the harm of this particular type of lie. In this post, I’d like to briefly summarize the rationale for the ruling and the dissent. Then I’d like to raise for discussion the way the “harm” of stolen valor is treated by the Court.

Continue reading →