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Honor Ethics

~ Devoted to the study of honor as an ethical value

Honor Ethics

Category Archives: anthropology of honor

Check out this “honorshame” spin on Christianity

19 Tuesday May 2015

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, religion and honor

≈ 8 Comments

Tags

Christianity and honor, honor-shame theology

I just discovered an organization called Honorshame: Resources for Majority World Ministry and had to share. Essentially, they are about framing Christianity in honor terms to make the religion more palatable to “shame” cultures. Here’s a video they produced:

They have a culture test (to determine your cultural type, according to their guilt-culture, shame-cultures, fear-culture model) and a theology guide that summarizes their approach.

Although I’m still perusing, it seems like they understand honor-shame cultures in a very Middle-Eastern/Asian way, and they contrast it with the African sort of tribal culture they see as “fear” based (even though those tribespeople would insist they are very concerned with honor themselves). Essentially, it seems to me, they are understanding authority and purity as honorable, not agonism and agonistic success (which is aristocratic or “tribal” apparently in their taxonomy).

Nonetheless, this is pretty advanced stuff, not too far behind the best research on cultural/moral psychology of honor, shame, etc., and clearly born of firsthand experience in these cultures. Thoughts?

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Should conscientious writers use scare quotes around the phrase “honor killings”?

07 Saturday Jun 2014

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, honor code, honor in contempory media, honor in the news, philosophy of honor

≈ 3 Comments

Pakistani human rights activists protest against the killing of pregnant woman Farzana Parveen for marrying a man she loved. Photo: Getty

Since honor killings are so-called, they present honor theorists interested in rehabilitating honor with perhaps our greatest rhetorical challenge. One strategy would be disassociating honor with honor killings: to say that they are honor killings in name only, but not in fact. As part of that strategy, we might decide to put scare quotes around the phrase “honor killings.” A recent, excellent article on honor killings by Aisha Gill exemplifies this liberal use of the scare quote approach.

[A note for non-writers and students: using quotes to mention a phrase qua term (as I did two sentences ago), and using quotes to draw attention to a term (as I do in the next sentence), are different from using scare quotes, which signal that you’re not endorsing the attitudes that might come with a sincere use of the quoted term.]

So this post isn’t devoted to condemning honor killings so much as making a “meta” point. Suppose a writer

  • Condemns honor killings,
  • Finds them even to be dishonorable, and
  • Wants to communicate both her condemnation of honor killings and yet her endorsement of the importance of being honorable.

Such a writer will inevitably contemplate using scare-quotes around the phrase “honor killing.” I want to argue that the scare-quote approach is incorrect.

My argument is premised on the claim that the word “honor” really is a descriptive term. It is not like “justice,” which is a “morally thick” term that has both descriptive and normative content. “Honor,” at least in the sense being used in the phrase “honor killings” (both in the mouths of those who condemn it and those who approve of it) simply refers to esteem, good standing, respectability. And these things supervene on the opinion of the honor group. Honor killings really are done for honor. Not faux-honor, but actual honor. Thus, using scare quotes around the phrase “honor killings” is not correct, even for a writer of the sort we’re imagining.

Objections and replies

OBJECTION: But these killings are not honorable—in fact, they’re dishonorable!

REPLY: Agreed. But honorableness is not the same as honor. Honor is analogous to wealth, or any other goodie (pleasure, freedom, candy, whatever). A capitalist thinks capitalist principles correctly say how the goodie of money should be gained and distributed. A socialist thinks socialist principles say how the goodie of money should be gained and distributed. They both see money as a goodie, but they disagree about the “ethic” that governs that goodie.

Honorableness concerns the correct way to get and distribute the goodie of honor. Unfortunately, honor theory is undeveloped at this point, and there are no handy names such as “socialism” or “capitalism” to denote different comprehensive and integrated theories about what’s honorable. All you and I know right now is that, whatever the correct theory is, it doesn’t permit honor killings.

Thus, the conscientious writer we’re imagining holds that the ethic governing honor says that honor shouldn’t be given to those who kill helpless, usually already-victimized girls and women. But just as it would be silly for a socialist to announce that, say, managing hedge funds isn’t about money but rather “money,” it would be incorrect, even for the conscientious writer above, to say that an honor killing isn’t about honor but “honor.”

OBJECTION: But we’re trying to shame people out of the practice of honor killings through our writing, and using scare quotes around the phrase helps drive home the message that we condemn honor killings.

REPLY: I think that this strategy perpetuates shallow and ultimately unpersuasive talk about values. No capitalist is (or should be) persuaded out of his capitalist beliefs by calling his money “filthy lucre”: that filthy lucre still pays the bills. And I doubt any proponent of honor killings will be persuaded out of his ancient beliefs by calling honor killings “honor killings,” especially when his honor group continues to honor him for what he does. The debate needs to turn to the ethics of honor. What are the principles that should govern our distribution of honor? Who should we honor, and why? These are questions about the meaning “honorableness”: “honorable,” like “justice” and unlike “honor,” is a morally thick term.

If I’m right about this, here are examples of correct usage:

“According to the U.N., 5,000 women are slain in honor killings every year.”

“These ‘honorable’ killings are often carried out by the victim’s family.”

“The so-and-so believe these acts to be honorable because of such-and-such.” [Acceptable because belief is a propositional attitude, and whatever you put in its scope isn’t an assertion of its truth.]

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Honor’s roots in male-male competition

30 Tuesday Jul 2013

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, biology of honor, ethology of honor, evolution of honor, honor and sport, honor code, honor in literature, honor system, philosophy of honor, social psychology of honor

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Some social psychologists have recently proposed taxonomies of the fundamental moral sentiments . . ..The emotions and practices of honor—esteem, contempt, respect, deference—developed, it is reasonable to suppose, with hierarchy in troops of early humans. Is honor, in this way, atavistic? It’s not a worry we can immediately dismiss.

–Kwame Appiah, The Honor Code, pp. 183-184

Some sort of moral pluralism—at least on the psychological level—is increasingly probable: a recent consensus statement by a number of cutting-edge moral psychologists affirms Jonathan Haidt et al.’s hypothesis that there are multiple building blocks of morality, each with its own evolutionary history.

Notably, Haidt’s taxonomy recognizes only one moral foundation that concerns rank: authoritarianism. But we have ample evidence in, say, athletic or academic rankings, that some rankings are not authoritarian. Also notable is that none of Haidt et al.’s (currently six) moral foundations has norms rooted in sexual selection, which is enormously influential in shaping behavior in many species, including us. Third, as Haidt’s taxonomy expanded, it lost the ability to account for shame and contempt, one of the “big three” condemnatory affect pairings that Moral Foundations theory was designed to accommodate. Fourth, Haidt sees his “harm/care” foundation as based in maternal instincts. This raises the question: could there be an ethos that is based on some sort of adaptive challenge males might have faced more often?

I think the honor ethos is one of these innate moral systems, and that honor fills all four gaps in Haidt’s theory.

Continue reading →

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Ruslan Tsarni and Group Honor

19 Friday Apr 2013

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, honor in the news

≈ 1 Comment

Here’s a video of the entire Ruslan Tsarni interview. It’s fascinating from many angles, but the importance of group honor is on full display here. Not only does Tsarni feel that his nephews brought shame on his innocent family, but on Chechnyans as a whole. Note at the end, at about 8:00 minutes in, he expresses the wish to kneel before the harmed families and beg forgiveness.

 

 

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Pastoralists and Honor: The Significance of Raiding to the Nisbett-Cohen Account of Honor

22 Monday Oct 2012

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, honor in literature, philosophy of honor, social psychology of honor

≈ 2 Comments

In my previous post, I mentioned the account of “cultures of honor” forwarded by Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen: on it, honor is an adaptive social construct constituted by tendencies to respond violently to threats or insults, thereby communicating to would-be attackers that the honorable person is dangerous prey and not to be trifled with. Nisbett and Cohen argue that these tendencies are rational in lawless circumstances where goods are easily stolen. For instance, cattle are easily rustled while crops are not, and this fact is used to explain why pastoralists are more often governed by honor norms than are agriculturalists. The pastoralist-honor connection is in turn used to explain the elevated honor-mindedness and violence one finds in the U.S. South, since that region was colonized by pastoralists from the British periphery.

I’d like to note in this post one difficulty with the Nisbett-Cohen account as I understand it. (I discuss my concerns more fully in an unpublished manuscript called “What Should Realists Say About Honor Cultures.”) The problem is simply this: if honor is a deterrence-based social construct, and this is used to explain why pastoralist societies tend to be cultures of honor, then it’s difficult to see why pastoralists would encourage raiding and praise it as honorable. But they tend to do just this.

Here are some interesting quotes about the connection between pastoralists and raiding:

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Mark Collier on Cultures of Honor and Moral Diversity

23 Sunday Sep 2012

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, philosophy of honor, social psychology of honor

≈ Leave a comment

Some honorethics.org contributors and readers will be familiar with the work by Richard Nisbett, Dov Cohen, and their collaborators on “cultures of honor,” as set forth in their important 1996 Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South.

Culture of Honor

In this book and the many subsequent articles based upon it, honor is an adaptive social construct constituted by tendencies to respond violently to threats or insults, thereby communicating to would-be attackers that the honorable person is dangerous prey and not to be trifled with. Nisbett and Cohen argue that these tendencies are rational in lawless circumstances where goods are easily stolen. For instance, cattle are easily rustled while crops are not, and this fact is used to explain why pastoralists are more often governed by honor norms than are agriculturalists. The pastoralist-honor connection is in turn used to explain the elevated honor-mindedness and violence one finds in the U.S. South, since that region was colonized by pastoralists from the British periphery.

Empirically-informed philosophers have seized upon the Nisbett-Cohen account of cultures of honor, usually taking it to suggest some sort of antirealist conclusion. For instance, John Doris, Stephen Stich, and Alexandra Plakias have argued that cultures of honor provide us with evidence of fundamental moral disagreement between liberal and honor cultures, i.e., disagreement that would persist even in ideal conditions, where all the non-moral facts were known, where each side was rational, and so forth.

My colleague (and honorethics.org contributor) Mark Collier has a paper forthcoming in the Journal of Scottish Philosophy criticizing this inference (now posted under honor scholarship). Using Hume’s notion of an “indulgent” stance towards cultural differences, Collier argues that even the findings of the culture of honor literature can be accommodated by convergentists, or people who deny the intractability of moral disagreement. For Collier, a core set of human values are plausibly universal, and the diversity we see can be explained by (and this is not necessarily an exhaustive list):

  • factual mistakes: you may think that dueling or carrying guns around makes people more polite, but it may in fact not;
  • differences in material circumstance: in tough circumstances, martial values may be emphasized;
  • and (in what is probably the most provocative part of the paper) different cultural conventions, which manifest these values in different ways, or weigh competing universal values differently.

On the last point, Collier considers some studies showing that Chinese are more willing than Americans to say that a magistrate may morally frame an innocent person for a murder he didn’t commit in order to prevent a mob from murdering more innocent people. Does this serve as evidence of fundamental moral disagreement? Collier doesn’t think so:

But this experimental result need not be interpreted in terms of a basic difference in attitude. The participants in the studies presumably share the same values: the welfare of individuals and society matter to everyone.  The groups merely disagree about how to prioritize these values when they come into conflict; the “mob and the magistrate” vignette, after all, is a classic moral dilemma. This study does not support the claim, then, that core values are fixed by enculturation. This type of disagreement between East Asians and Westerners merely indicates, rather, that there is a range of adequate natural moralities . . ..

Here’s Collier’s abstract.

In “A Dialogue”, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic.  Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our basic values are fixed by enculturation.  Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward those whose attitudes differ from ours.  He proposes a more charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to fundamental principles of human nature.  Contemporary philosophers attempt to locate examples of moral variability that cannot be accommodated in this way.  But they are no more successful than their predecessors.  Moral skeptics have yet to find a single case of moral diversity that is resistant to the Humean strategy. 

I think Collier’s paper really advances the debate about the metaethical significance of honor-based norms. He welcomes comments; you can find the paper here.

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Talks given at “Honor and Ethics” mini-conference

04 Saturday Aug 2012

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, honor and ethics conference, philosophy of honor, political science of honor

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[Edit: Thanks to a reader who alerted me to the fact that the entire lectures were not uploaded. That has been fixed, and Shannon French’s very engaging talk on warrior codes has been added as well]

I finally got around to uploading the talks given at the Midwest Philosophy Colloquium’s Honor and Ethics mini-conference. The conference was held at the University of Minnesota, Morris, on April 6, 2012.

Some more talks from that event may be posted soon—I’m just waiting for permission from the relevant speakers.

Frank Stewart, “An Anthropologist Looks at Honor”

Part 1

part 2

part 3

 

Lad Sessions, “Honor, Morality, Brotherhood”

Part 2

Part 3

 

Laurie Johnson, “Honor in Today’s America”

part 2

Part 3

 

Ryan Rhodes, “Honor and the Moral Value of Reputation” (Ryan didn’t have a mic, so the sound is a bit iffy at some points, but well worth a viewing. We’ll try to get Ryan to post his paper on this blog.)

Part 2

 

Shannon French, “Honor Through the Ages: Differing Conceptions of a Key Concept at the Heart of the Warrior’s Code”

Part 2

Part 3

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Honor and Ethics mini-conference: speaker bios and abstracts

03 Tuesday Apr 2012

Posted by dan demetriou in announcements, anthropology of honor, history of honor, honor code, honor system, philosophy of honor, political science of honor

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The 36th Annual Midwest Philosophy Colloquium on “Honor and Ethics” is this Friday, April 6, at the University of Minnesota, Morris. The schedule and other particulars can be found here.

We at UMM are very excited to be hosting this first-of-its-kind event!

About our speakers (in order of presentation):

Ryan Rhodes is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Oklahoma, where in May he will defend a dissertation on Honor. He has previously co-authored a chapter of Batman and Philosophy, and presented a paper on the relationship of Newcomb’s problem to freedom and foreknowledge. His other research interests include the use of fiction in philosophical illumination, and situationist challenges to virtue ethics.

Stephen Mathis is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wheaton College in Norton, Massachusetts, where he teaches courses in Social/Political Philosophy and Legal Philosophy, and also serves as Pre-Law Advisor. His primary area of research concerns action theoretical issues within the criminal law, but he has also written on moral theory, moral issues in education, and moral and economic issues in sports.

Shannon French is Director of the Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence at Case Western Reserve University. Prior to leading the Inamori Center, Dr. French was the associate chair of the Department of Leadership, Ethics and Law at the United States Naval Academy. Dr. French’s research and scholarly interests are primarily in the area of military ethics, but also include leadership ethics, professional ethics, moral psychology, biomedical and environmental ethics. Her The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values, Past and Present (2003) features a forward by Senator John McCain.

Laurie Johnson is a Professor of Political Science at Kansas State University, specializing in political thought. She is the author of five books, including Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism; Political Thought: A Guide to the Classics; Hobbes’s Leviathan; Thomas Hobbes: Turning Point for Honor; and soon to be published Locke and Rousseau: Two Enlightenment Responses to Honor. Dr. Johnson is Director of the Primary Texts Certificate at Kansas State.

Frank Stewart is a Professor Emeritus at the department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His research interests are in social anthropology, linguistics, and the law, with a special focus on the Bedouin of the Sinai. He has taught or held research appointments at New York University, Harvard Law School, and the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies. Honor (1994) is one of his many publications.

Lad Sessions is a Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Washington and Lee University, where he started teaching in 1971. He is the author of three books, the most recent being Honor for Us: A Philosophical Analysis, Interpretation, and Defense (2010). Dr. Sessions’ many academic publications discuss issues ranging from philosophy of religion, Rawls on liberalism, the philosophy of science, and the nature of sportsmanship.

Abstracts

Ryan Rhodes, “Honor and the Moral Value of Reputation”

Some of the most common objections to honor-based ethics concern its emphasis on pride and reputation, and the charge that the person of honor has an essentially backwards moral orientation. On one hand, he cares too much about other people and their perceptions, to the detriment of his virtue and authenticity. On another, he cares too much about himself and his regard, to the detriment of others’ welfare. Hence, this feature of honor is seen as a hindrance to true morality. I argue that this view rests on a mistake. That is not to say that there is nothing to the objections in question, but rather that they fail to recognize a crucial role of public esteem in the moral life. Pride and reputation are essential constituents of good character, because the ability to exercise virtue in a community depends in part on how one is perceived. The positive regard of others is something we ought to care about for specifically moral reasons, because it enables one to engage and lead those others in the quest for greater human excellence. As such, the honorable person rightly cares about being viewed favorably, because he cares about the values his life stands for and their relation to the good of other people.

Stephen Mathis, “Justifying Academic Honor Codes”

Academic honor codes at colleges and universities seek to (and very often do) express the values and commitments of the academy, often more explicitly and powerfully than any other feature of academic institutions. For this reason alone, academic honor codes are worth studying more closely. In this talk, I argue that honor codes help to define the individual academic communities in which they arise, and the features those various codes—and communities—share are characteristic of the academy as a whole. If I am right about this claim, then academic honor codes would identify and reinforce the boundaries of the academic community as a moral community; so characterized, academic honor codes would warrant attention, even from those at institutions without them. The best justification for such codes is one which prioritizes the academic pursuit of knowledge above many other interests, including the individual self-interest of the students subject to those codes.

Shannon French, “Honor Through the Ages:  Differing Conceptions of a Key Concept at the Heart of the Warrior’s Code”

I will examine how the concept of honor was understood in different historical warrior cultures, including those of the Roman legions and the Japanese samurai. I will also consider the idealized accounts of warrior honor that are depicted in classic works as Homer’s epics and ancient Icelandic sagas. Finally, I comment on what role the concept of honor can and should play in the culture of the modern US military.

Laurie Johnson, “Honor in Today’s America: The Liberal Origins of Honor’s Decline”

I will discuss the importance of honor in three areas of contemporary significance: the economy, the family, and academics. All three have been negatively impacted by a loss of honor as a motivation for doing the right thing. The economic crisis that began in 2007 was, by many accounts, partly brought on by a lack of concern for honor and integrity in the banking and investment industries. The ongoing disintegration of the American family reveals the loss of honor and responsibility in our closest relationships. Integrity and honor in academic endeavors has also declined, with an increase in plagiarism and other forms of cheating. I will also briefly discuss my research, which connects key classical liberal ideas with the decline of honor as a motivation in modern society. Liberal ideals such as individualism and individual rights, the contract as the model for personal relationships, materialism, and the elevated importance of privacy, all can be connected with the decline in the importance of honor. I ask, can there be an honor code compatible with liberalism?

Frank Stewart, “An Anthropologist Looks at Honor”

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of Bedouin law is a cluster of institutions centered on the concept of ‘ard. I suggest that Bedouin ‘ard is a right of a particular kind, and that in the major European languages the word ‘honor’ also often refers to the same kind of right. I shall call that right personal honor. Its main characteristics are: (i) it is a right to respect, (ii) it can be lost, (iii) in order to retain it one must follow certain rules, the honor code, and (iv), there is at least one word or phrase that is regularly used to refer to this right. Personal honor is therefore part of what may be called a (personal) honor system, and these four items define such a system, albeit in an extremely rough and ready way. For an honor system to function there must also, of course, be an honor group, that is, a set of people who have a joint commitment to the honor code. The notion of an honor system represents an attempt to develop a cross-cultural concept from the notion of honor as it functioned until recently in certain strata of Western societies, and as it still functions among the Bedouin.  Honor systems are probably also to be found in other Middle Eastern, Central Asian and North African societies, though our information about them is at best sketchy. Whether such systems are, or were, to be found elsewhere in the world, I do not know. My hope is that if this question is addressed, then the answer will not only bring new facts to light, but also lead to improvements to the crude model of such a system that is presented here.

Lad Sessions, “Honor, Morality, Brotherhood”

This discussion is a conceptual analysis—with a wee bit of prescription. I regard my analyses as more provocative than conclusive; while I do hope they will prove persuasive, perhaps because they harmonize with unanalyzed concepts you already have, I will be content if they merely (!) induce further reflection. The proposals are no mere academic exercises; they have substantial implications.  I intend to highlight some important resemblances and some vital differences among three concepts that are distinct but which are easily confused and conflated, with arguably dangerous results. I call these three concepts Honor, Morality, and Brotherhood, and I intend to stretch them as widely as possible, beyond their origins in certain local contexts. They are familiar to all, yet easily misunderstood—or perhaps I should say quite differently understood. I have three basic tasks, each three-fold: (i) to sketch my account of each of the three concepts; (ii) to highlight three important similarities and differences among them; and (iii) to suggest three important issues, or lines of inquiry, that result from seeing things this way.

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Tales of honor!

21 Friday Oct 2011

Posted by dan demetriou in anthropology of honor, history of honor, honor in literature, stories of honor

≈ Leave a comment

Honor theorists need examples of honor-typical behavior. Rehabilitationists (honor theorists who want to revive honor) especially need positive stories of honor-typical behavior. For instance, Sharon Krause, in her excellent Liberalism with Honor, makes important use of various positive examples of honor, including the refusal of the Viscount de Orte to follow Charles IX’s orders to slaughter Huguenots (p. 44ff).

In light of this, I thought it would be beneficial to start a thread where people can share stories that represent distinctively honorable deeds.

Guidelines:

  1. Stories, not sayings.
  2. May be fictional or non-fictional.
  3. Stories should represent (what you see as) paradigmatically honor-typical behavior. That is, the story/circumstances should make clear why this is a tale of honor especially, as opposed to some other value or virtue.
  4. Stories should represent (what you see as) “truly” honorable behavior–that is, behavior that you endorse or come very close to endorsing, as opposed to behavior that is merely “honor-typical” but that you wouldn’t endorse. For example, you might be of the opinion that Achilles’ sulking in his tent because he was insulted is honor-typical, but not something that is actually honorable. If so, then this wouldn’t be the right sort of story to post in this thread.

I’ll start with a perhaps controversial example…

Continue reading →

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Recent events:

Kansas State mini-conference: "Perspectives on Modern Honor"

Book series: Honor and Obligation in Liberal Society

Honor and Ethics Mini-Conference

Contributors

  • Andrea Mansker
  • Craig Bruce Smith
  • Dan Demetriou (administrator)
  • Graham Oddie
  • Jim Peterman
  • Joe Thomas
  • Lad Sessions
  • Laurie M. Johnson
  • Mark Collier
  • Mark Griffith
  • Paul Robinson
  • Peter Olsthoorn
  • Robert Oprisko
  • Ryan Rhodes
  • Shannon French
  • Sharon Krause
  • Steven Skultety
  • Tamler Sommers
  • Tony Cunningham
  • Valerie Soon

Recent posts

  • Two new books on honor by contributors Tamler Sommers and Craig Bruce Smith
  • Jordan Peterson on the play/honor (agonism) ethic
  • Honor and the Military Photo Scandal
  • HonorShame.com write-up of Honor in the Modern World
  • “Ethics for Adversaries” blog

Contributors’ Books

Johnson and Demetriou's Honor in the Modern World

Peter Olsthoorn's Honor in Political and Moral Philosophy

Joe Thomas' Leadership, Ethics and Law of War Discussion Guide for Marines

Anthony Cunningham's Modern Honor

Laurie Johnson's Locke and Rousseau: Two Enlightenment Responses to Honor

Peter Olsthoorn's Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st Century

Tamler Sommers' A Very Bad Wizard

Lad Sessions' Honor For Us

Andrea Mansker's Sex, Honor and Citizenship in Early Third Republic France

Laurie Johnson's Thomas Hobbes: Turning Point for Honor

Shannon French's The Code of the Warrior

Sharon Krause's Liberalism With Honor

Robert Oprisko's Honor: A Phenomenology

Graham Oddie's Value, Reality, Desire

Paul Robinson's Military Honour and the Conduct of War

Jim Peterman's Philosophy as Therapy

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